OFFICIAL DOCUMENT

Explanation Atlas System for Cyberscope audit

Report: Cyberscope, Corrected Phase 2

Network: BNB Smart Chain

Date of explanation: July 25, 2026

Report date: June 30, 2026

Explanation version: 2.0

This is the official comment Atlas System for each auditor's comment. The document does not refute the audit, change the assigned criticality, or declare comments closed. His task is to translate technical statements into understandable language and explain how the corresponding part of the system is organized in Atlas.

1 1. About the document and audit boundaries

Cyberscope checked a set of source files `PositionHandler.sol`, `Transport.sol`, `LockupFlow.sol`, `DailyFlow.sol`, `Distrib.sol` and related interfaces. The Corrected Phase 2 version of the report contains 20 comments:

- 1 Critical;
- 2 Medium;
- 17 Minor / Informative.

All 20 comments are marked by the auditor as `Unresolved`. This clarification does not change this status. If Atlas describes an actual configuration that reduces the applicability of a particular scenario, this is an explanation of the current configuration, not a standalone closure of the note.

The audit refers to specific source files and their SHA-256 listed in the June 30, 2026 report. After this date, the architecture could receive new deployments or changed versions of contracts. In particular, the current address Daily Flow V2 is included in the current register, but should not automatically be considered the audited June report without a separate confirmation of the auditor or a separate audit of this version.

Smart contract auditing helps identify code errors and architectural dependencies. It does not guarantee:

- constant availability of liquidity;
- execution of each future Claim;
- economic sustainability of the model;
- absence of administrative, market and user risks;
- security of code versions that were not part of the checked set of files.

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2 2. Current register of contracts and infrastructure

The registry below is intended to help the reader understand which addresses apply to the current Atlas architecture. This is a separate task from defining audit boundaries.

2.1. Atlas Contracts

Component	Purpose	Address
Lockup Flow	Smart Cycle with a set deadline and Claim after the cycle conditions are met	`0x8F6daC6F25A5038112E1A01f1cBBD682e4D64889`

Component	Purpose	Address
Daily Flow V2	Current Daily Flow with daily calculation and current commission logic	`0x8e61483d45a822cCB59482c47e1b6D28465605EC`
Transport	Service output USDT from the general LP position for the partner payment circuit	`0x5a71807861dBFc41aB016271C3191bF96322D42e`
Distribute	Affiliate payments from your own balance USDT	`0xEF156690b98AEc4F805Ec820268B9092bd83B76f`

2.2. Liquidity and external contracts

Component	Purpose	Address or ID
SAFE Atlas	Owner LP-NFT and main contracts management loop	`0xB0E4699710f98BB13fDaAB887a5D821eDb5DB559`
LP-position Atlas	Total concentrated liquidity position	`tokenId 6928212`
PancakeSwap V3 Nonfungible Position Manager	External contract PancakeSwap, managing LP-NFT	`0x46A15B0b27311cedF172AB29E4f4766fbE7F4364`
Pool PancakeSwap V3 USDT/USDC	Public pool in which the Atlas position and positions of other suppliers are located	`0x92b7807bF19b7DDdf89b706143896d05228f3121`
USDT BEP-20	Atlas main settlement token	`0x55d398326f99059fF775485246999027B3197955`
USDC BEP-20	Second token of the LP pair	`0x8AC76a51cc950d9822D68b83fE1Ad97B32Cd580d`

2.3. Administrative addresses

Component	Purpose	Address
Treasury	Receiving commissions sent by Atlas contracts	`0x20Cdf9839faC80cCDC38CE74D41bD55A93DD87F2`
Owner Distribute	Address authorized to trigger payments from Distribute	`0x4c7445C39ee62d3F798f9Fd6a61e9399E3dc8Fae`
SAFE signer 1	One of the on-chain signatories SAFE	`0x7709e4eDcC55714F83027EF39062d7f9761273B6`
SAFE signer 2	One of the on-chain signatories SAFE	`0x14F9b2cE2850057CAd8e1A9cFeD6eedA777D1C44`
SAFE signer 3	One of the on-chain signatories SAFE	`0xD067C66C9f4D16130B118929B7BB7Fec5C6FD051`

At the time of the control shot SAFE used the scheme `2-of-3` : two out of three confirmations were required to complete the operation. This reduces the dependency on a single key, but does not eliminate the SAFE authority.

2.4. How the components are connected





Several custom orders use one LP position. Balance Distribute, fees Treasury, total public pool liquidity, and the assets of a specific Atlas LP position are different measures. They cannot be added together and called one number without a separate methodology.

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3 3. How to read the explanations

The same structure is used for each of the 20 comments:

01 **Auditor's Note** - what exactly is recorded in the report.

02 **In simple words** is the practical meaning of the technical formulation.

03 **Atlas Official Explanation** - why the corresponding mechanics exist or how they are configured.

04 **What is important to understand** - persisting condition, constraint or dependency.

4

4. Auditor’s observations and clarifications Atlas

01

4.1. FRM - First-Come Reward Model

Criticality in the report: Critical
Status in the report: Unresolved

Auditor’s note. Lockup Flow and Daily Flow pay out funds from the common position PancakeSwap V3. A separate reserve is not created for each order. Therefore, earlier successful Claim can use the liquidity that later participants rely on.

In simple words. The order record shows how much and under what conditions should be paid to the participant, but this record does not mean that the required amount lies separately and is waiting only for him. Funds from different orders work through one common position.

Atlas official explanation. The general position is used deliberately: Smart Cycle is a redistribution mechanism with general liquidity, and not a system of individual deposit boxes. The order fixes the rules of a particular cycle, but does not create a personal wallet or a separate reserve.

What is important to understand. The Claim capability depends on the actual state of the overall position and the order of executed transactions. The settlement amount for the order is not equal to the personally reserved amount.

02

4.2. AOW - Arbitrary Owner Withdrawal

Criticality in the report: Medium
Status in the report: Unresolved

Auditor's note. Function `claimReferral()` in Transport allows the owner to specify the recipient address and withdrawal amount from the shared LP position. In Transport itself there is no on-chain accounting for partner accruals, limits or proof of entitlement to the specified amount.

In simple words. The authorized owner of Transport can technically request the withdrawal of the selected amount to the selected address. The contract itself does not check whether the transaction matches the entry for a specific affiliate reward.

Atlas official explanation. Transport is a service contract. It is used to move funds to the partner payment circuit, after which Distribute makes final payments from its balance. Transport is controlled via SAFE `2-of-3`, and not with one regular key.

What is important to understand. SAFE reduces the risk of compromising a single key, but does not limit the authority of the code itself. Transport does not record Distribute as the only possible recipient, so the signing procedure and public monitoring of transactions remain a trust boundary.

03

4.3. CRD - Claims Range Dependent

Criticality in the report: Medium
Status in the report: Unresolved

Auditor's note. Adding and removing liquidity is only allowed when the current tick is on the expected side of the LP position's range. If the price enters the range, Claim or the withdrawal may end `revert`.

In simple words. Even if the order has expired, the contract first checks the position status PancakeSwap. If the price position is inappropriate, the operation is not performed.

Atlas official explanation. Atlas position is configured out of range on the USDT side. This configuration was chosen for regular one-way work with USDT, and not for constant market making within the range.

What is important to understand. The setting reduces the likelihood of blocking during normal movement of the USDT/USDC pair, but does not eliminate it completely. A strong depeg, range change, or other change in pool state may temporarily render Claim unavailable.

04

4.4. CCR - Contract Centralization Risk

Criticality in the report: Minor / Informative
Status in the report: Unresolved

Auditor's note. In contracts there are owner functions that allow you to change Treasury, the commission size and the used `tokenId`. The operation of the system depends on the external configuration and actions of authorized addresses.

In simple words. Some important parameters are not fixed forever. The administration can change them through an authorized on-chain transaction.

Atlas official explanation. Atlas does not claim that the current version is fully decentralized. Controlled parameters allow you to maintain the infrastructure and change the working LP position. The main contracts and LP-NFT are controlled by SAFE `2-of-3`; Distribute has a separate owner.

What is important to understand. Multi-signature reduces the risk of a single key, but does not override administrative authority. Changes to parameters must be verified on the blockchain.

05

4.5. ELFM - Exceeds Fees Limit

Criticality in the report: Minor / Informative
Status in the report: Unresolved

Auditor's note. Function `setFee()` allows commission setting up to `100%` since the upper bound is `PRECISION`.

In simple words. The code does not limit the commission to a small predetermined maximum. An authorized owner can technically set the value to a very high value.

Atlas official explanation. In the current configuration, custom Flow and Distribute use commission `10%`, and Transport - `0%`. For master contracts, the change is made via SAFE.

What is important to understand. Current setting does not remove the possibility of future change. Before a significant operation, the user or analyst can re-read `platformFee` in BscScan.

06

4.6. IWH - Insufficient Withdrawal Handling

Criticality in the report: Minor / Informative
Status in the report: Unresolved

Auditor's note. `_withdrawPool()` may return less than the estimated amount. The code of the audited version does not require a strict match between the actually received and the expected value, which is why partial payment, loss of the balance or `revert` when calculating the commission.

In simple words. The contract asks for one amount, but can theoretically receive less from the LP position. Further behavior depends on whether the received quantity is sufficient for calculations.

Atlas official explanation. Atlas considers the actual amount received from the total position to be the critical value of the transaction. The clarification does not close the note: strict underpayment protection must be supported by the specific version code and individual tests being used.

What is important to understand. You cannot assume that any calculated amount will be automatically withdrawn in full. The current version requires separate checking of behavior with insufficient liquidity and at rounding limits.

07

4.7. LBR - Liquidity Base Reduction

Criticality in the report: Minor / Informative
Status in the report: Unresolved

Auditor's note. Each successful Claim reduces the active liquidity of the overall position as funds are withdrawn through `decreaseLiquidity`.

In simple words. Incoming transactions increase the total position, and payments decrease it. Funds are not required to constantly remain in the pool and generate trading commissions.

Atlas official explanation. The position decrease at Claim is part of the redistribution mechanics Smart Cycle. The LP position is used as a general on-chain contour for the movement of funds, and not as an immutable reserve.

What is important to understand. The size of the active position changes after each incoming and outgoing transaction. The historical volume of deposited funds does not equal the current available liquidity.

08

4.8. MTC - Manipulatable Tick Check

Criticality in the report: Minor / Informative
Status in the report: Unresolved

Auditor's note. The contract uses the current `slot0().tick`, that is, the spot state of the pool, and not the average TWAP price. Spot tick can be temporarily changed by swaps.

In simple words. The decision about the availability of an operation is made based on the current state of the pool at that moment. It is not confirmed by an additional source or averaging over the period.

Atlas official explanation. Tick is used as a technical condition of the position side, and not as a price at which the order amount is calculated. The position's range is far from the normal USDT/USDC parity, so a small market movement usually does not change the test result.

What is important to understand. The dependence on one spot tick is preserved. Unusual market movement, depeg or economically achievable manipulation may affect the availability of the operation.

09

4.9. NOM - NFT Ownership Missing

Criticality in the report: Minor / Informative
Status in the report: Unresolved

Auditor's note. Flow contracts interact with LP-NFT, but do not own it themselves and do not check ownership before each operation. Without Position Manager permission, calls may end `revert`.

In simple words. A contract can work with a general position only as long as its owner allows it to do so.

Atlas official explanation. This is the custody model used: LP-NFT `#6928212` belongs to SAFE Atlas, and work contracts are issued `operator approval`. The NFT is not transferred ownership to every Flow contract.

What is important to understand. SAFE may revoke permission or transfer LP-NFT. The corresponding contract will then lose access to the position and related operations will stop.

10

4.10. NFU - Non-USDT Fees Unhandled

Criticality in the report: Minor / Informative
Status in the report: Unresolved

Auditor's note. `collect()` can return both tokens of a pair, but the audited logic only considers and translates the configured target token. The second token may remain outside the user calculation.

In simple words. The position consists of USDT and USDC. If a contract receives USDC, the code will not necessarily treat it the same way as USDT.

Atlas official explanation. The standard script is designed for the position of the position on the USDT-side. Therefore, the main product logic works with USDT.

What is important to understand. The out-of-range position itself is not software processing of the second token. An unexpectedly received USDC requires separate accounting and a clear procedure for further actions.

11

4.11. NTC - Non-USDT Token Control

Criticality in the report: Minor / Informative
Status in the report: Unresolved

Auditor's note. If the second token of an LP pair is controlled by the owner or a trusted party, a change in its supply may affect the price, tick, availability Claim and position value.

In simple words. The system depends not only on USDT, but also on the second token of the pair. Problems with the second token can change the state of the pool.

Atlas official explanation. In the current public pool, the second token is USDC. Atlas does not issue or manage the issuance of USDC, so Atlas cannot mint, burn, or change the supply of this token on its own.

What is important to understand. The risks of the issuer USDC, blocking of tokens, depeg and external infrastructure remain. Atlas' lack of control does not mean there is no external risk.

12

4.12. PAI - Possible Approval Incompatibility

Criticality in the report: Minor / Informative
Status in the report: Unresolved

Auditor's note. The normal Position Manager resolution is used `approve()`. Some non-standard ERC-20 require a different sequence and may reject such a call.

In simple words. The code may not be compatible with some uncommon tokens, especially if they require the old permission to be reset first.

Atlas official explanation. Smart Cycle works with a fixed official USDT BEP-20, not an arbitrary user-selected token. This reduces the practical applicability of the scenario.

What is important to understand. A limited list of tokens does not change the implementation itself `approve()`. Compatibility and re-operations with allowance must be checked on the current version of the contract.

13

4.13. PDFD - Possible Double Fee Deduction

Criticality in the report: Minor / Informative
Status in the report: Unresolved

Auditor's note. Both Transport and Distribute contain separate commission logic. If both contracts use a non-zero commission in the same payout chain, the commission may be deducted twice.

In simple words. One affiliate payment goes through two contracts. If each of them withdraws their commission, the partner will receive less than the expected amount.

Atlas official explanation. In the current configuration, Transport uses `fee 0%` and transfers the amount to Distribute. Distribute holds `10%` at final payment. With this configuration, the commission in the affiliate circuit is deducted once.

What is important to understand. Commission values are changeable parameters. No double hold depends on maintaining the current configuration.

14

4.14. PTAI - Potential Transfer Amount Inconsistency

Criticality in the report: Minor / Informative
Status in the report: Unresolved

Auditor's note. Fee-on-transfer token may actually transfer less than specified `transferFrom()`. If the contract takes into account the amount requested rather than the amount actually received, a discrepancy arises.

In simple words. The user sends a conditional 100 tokens, but the transfer tax token can only deliver 90 to the contract.

Atlas official explanation. The current model uses the official USDT BEP-20, which does not apply transfer tax in normal Atlas operation. The contract is not intended for arbitrary tax tokens.

What is important to understand. The applicability of the note is reduced by the selected token, but a correct accounting system should still be based on the amount actually received.

15

4.15. RLW - Rounded Liquidity Withdrawal

Criticality in the report: Minor / Informative
Status in the report: Unresolved

Auditor's note. After calculating the liquidity volume, the code adds one. This may result in an attempt to withdraw a little more than necessary, an additional withdrawal, or a complete `revert` at the border of available liquidity.

In simple words. The contract rounds the calculation up to avoid receiving less due to rounding down. But at the very edge of the position, even one extra unit can make a difference.

Atlas official explanation. Adding one is used to compensate for the peculiarities of integer mathematics PancakeSwap V3. The surplus target token in the audited logic is sent to Treasury as position reward.

What is important to understand. Rounding compensation does not guarantee successful output. Boundary values, accumulated commissions and insufficient liquidity should be checked by separate tests.

16

4.16. SMC - Strict Maturity Check

Criticality in the report: Minor / Informative
Status in the report: Unresolved

Auditor's note. Lockup Flow allows Claim only when `block.timestamp` is strictly greater than the completion time, not equal to it.

In simple words. At the exact second of the deadline, Claim is not yet available. You need to wait for the next block with a later time.

Atlas official explanation. This is a time comparison feature in the code. It does not change the recipient's address or transfer the Claim right to another person.

What is important to understand. The actual availability of a transaction always depends on the time of the next block. The interface should not promise execution at the exact second.

17

4.17. URR - Unrealistic Reward Rates

Criticality in the report: Minor / Informative
Status in the report: Unresolved

Auditor's note. The contracts specify high fixed settlement values, and a guaranteed external source of income that sustainably finances payments is not defined in the code.

In simple words. The formula can calculate the amount, but the formula itself does not create money or reserve it for future payment.

Atlas official explanation. The percentages Smart Cycle are parameters of the redistribution model. Atlas does not attribute them to guaranteed income from trading, mining or LP fees, and does not represent them as guaranteed investment returns.

What is important to understand. Calculated Delta is not equal to the guaranteed result. The possibility of payment depends on the overall liquidity and the actual operation of the mechanism.

18

4.18. L04 - Conformance to Solidity Naming Conventions

Criticality in the report: Minor / Informative
Status in the report: Unresolved

Auditor's note. Some names and design elements of the source code do not fully comply with the Solidity Style Guide.

In simple words. The code can be formatted more consistently to make it easier for third-party developers to read and maintain.

Atlas official explanation. This note relates to the quality and support of the sources. It does not change the bytecode of an already deployed contract and does not itself describe a separate method for withdrawing funds.

What is important to understand. Code readability affects the quality of future changes and reviews, so the note remains useful even without directly affecting the current transaction.

19 4.19. L13 - Divide before Multiply Operation

Criticality in the report: Minor / Informative
Status in the report: Unresolved

Auditor's note. In Daily Flow part of the calculation is division before subsequent multiplication. In Solidity integer arithmetic, this may prematurely discard the fractional part.

In simple words. If you first round a number down and then multiply, the result will sometimes be slightly less than if you did the opposite.

Atlas official explanation. The calculation is deterministic: the same input data gives the same result. However, the accuracy of the minimum token units must be consistent with the published formula and display in the interface.

What is important to understand. The note applies to the audited version of Daily Flow. For the current Daily Flow V2 the order of calculation and the result must be checked separately against its source code.

20 4.20. L19 - Stable Compiler Version

Criticality in the report: Minor / Informative
Status in the report: Unresolved

Auditor's note. Used in source codes `pragma solidity ^0.8.20`, so different compatible versions of the compiler can compile different bytecode.

In simple words. If you compile the same code with a different compiler in the future, the resulting contract may differ.

Atlas official explanation. Already expanded bytecode does not change due to recording `pragma`. For a repeatable build, it is important to record the exact compiler version, optimizer options, and dependencies for each deployment.

What is important to understand. Status `Contract: Verified` in BscScan allows you to match published source code to a specific bytecode, but does not replace a reproducible build and security audit.

5

5. What you can check yourself

Contracts and settings

- source code and ABI in the tab `Contract` to BscScan;
- `owner`, `pendingOwner`, `treasury`, `platformFee` i `tokenId`;
- history of changes to owners and parameters;
- order creation and execution events Claim.

LP-position

- owner LP-NFT via `ownerOf(6928212)`;
- `getApproved(6928212)` i `isApprovedForAll(SAFE, operator)`;
- tokens, fee tier and position range;
- current assets are Atlas positions, and not the total liquidity of the entire pool.

Management

- current threshold SAFE;
- current list of on-chain signatories;
- transactions SAFE changing permissions, owners, Treasury, fee or `tokenId`;
- current owner Distribute.

6

6. Official links

Cyberscope report ↗

Atlas smart contract registry ↗

Lockup Flow to BscScan ↗

Daily Flow V2 to BscScan ↗

Transport to BscScan ↗

Distribute to BscScan ↗

SAFE Atlas to BscScan ↗

LP-NFT Atlas #6928212 ↗

Pool PancakeSwap V3 USDT/USDC ↗

7. Document status

This is an informational note Atlas System. It does not constitute a new audit, legal opinion, investment recommendation, guarantee of security, guarantee of liquidity or promise of payment.

If there is a discrepancy between this explanation and the original report, Cyberscope's language takes precedence with respect to the content and status of the audit observations. When checking the current configuration, the current on-chain data BNB Smart Chain takes priority.